Hazard Detection Techniques

Before risk can effectively be managed, it is important to identify any hazards in the workplace; the following are some techniques that can be used.

Many hazard identification techniques rely on observation by the assessor(s) and are dependent on the experience and knowledge of the assessor.
The analyst should observe the work being done, including the work being carried out by groups of operators, looking for:

• Actual and potential hazards – by observation and questioning.
• Less obvious ‘invisible’ hazards – such as health dangers from fumes, gases, noise, lighting and dangerous substances, etc.
• Behavioral aspects – rules and precautions for controlling any hazard or risk should be supplied by the operator, his/her supervisor, or a specialist, but are they being followed?

Task analysis is used to analyze all aspects of a task (including safety), often with the intention of improving efficiency. A job can also be analyzed with an emphasis on safety or hazards.
The assessor divides the task into a number of steps, considering each step separately. The results of this analysis can be used to correct existing problems and to improve, among other things:

• Safe working methods, working instructions, worker protection, safety rules, emergency procedures, and serviceability of machinery and plant.
• Reporting of hazards, and provision of information.
• The layout of work areas.

To ensure a consistent and comprehensive approach to checking all the safety elements to be covered during an inspection, a checklist or inspection form is usually developed that covers the key issues. Checklists should also be structured to provide a coherent approach to the inspection process. This helps in the monitoring of the inspection process and analysis of the results, as well as simplifying the task of carrying out the inspection itself. Checklists do have some limitations in that although they prompt the assessor when looking for hazards, any hazard not identified in the list is less likely to be noticed.
One helpful method of structuring a checklist is by using the “4 Ps”, as promoted by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE):

While checklists are often included in safety procedures and manuals, do not feel that they cannot be changed and adapted. In particular, in terms of maintenance and safety inspections, the list should not act as a constraint on the inspector(s) identifying other potential problems or hazards. Checklists should be reviewed regularly to take account of recent or proposed developments in health and safety issues in the particular workplace.

These represent reactive, but nonetheless useful, data. Reports can arise from external notification requirements under national legislation (discussed in Element IA3), or from internal reporting of all loss and near-miss events.

Certain accidents and occupational ill-health incidents may be reported to, and analysed by, government regulators or enforcement agencies. In such cases, annual reports are usually published giving detailed figures of reported accidents ‘analysed by cause’. These are useful when comparing differing sectors of industry.

Each company should maintain its own records, not just of ‘notifiable’ accidents and ill health, but of all accidents that have taken place. In this way, any trends, or particular areas that show significant changes, can be investigated at the earliest opportunity. The reports will also be a useful tool when carrying out risk assessments.

The techniques we have described are usually more than adequate for most risk assessments. In more complex systems it may be necessary to use more structured methods to identify hazards. One powerful technique is called a Hazard and Operability Study (or HAZOP).
This breaks down a system, such as a chemical process, into different sections and then systematically asks what could go wrong in that section, what would be the consequences, and what measures could be introduced to reduce the likelihood of the failure occurring or, if it does fail, might mitigate the consequences. We will look at this and other techniques later in this element.

Rather than relying on one individual to undertake hazard identification, the team approach to risk assessment involves workers who have relevant experience and knowledge of the process or activity being considered, as they are likely to have the best understanding of the hazards.
Involving workers also increases the “ownership” of the assessment as, having contributed to the exercise, an individual is more likely to appreciate the need for compliance with the control measures identified.

Can you think of any other reasons why workers should be involved? Please comment below